

STATE V. SOTELO

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**STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
AMANDA SOTELO,
Defendant-Appellant.**

NO. A-1-CA-37397

COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO

November 13, 2018

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CURRY COUNTY, Fred T. Van Soelen,
District Judge

COUNSEL

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, Gregory B. Dawkins, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant

JUDGES

LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge. WE CONCUR: STEPHEN G. FRENCH, Judge, EMIL J. KIEHNE, Judge

AUTHOR: LINDA M. VANZI

MEMORANDUM OPINION

VANZI, Chief Judge.

{1} Defendant appeals her convictions for aggravated battery, aggravated DWI, resisting, driving with a revoked license, open container, and concealing identity. We

issued a calendar notice proposing to affirm. Defendant has responded with a memorandum in opposition. Not persuaded, we affirm.

{2} Initially, we note that we have two separate records reflecting the fact that two criminal proceedings were consolidated for sentencing. We will refer to the records as CR-363 and CR-417.

{3} Defendant continues to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support her convictions. [MIO 3] See generally *State v. Armijo*, 1997-NMCA-080, ¶ 16, 123 N.M. 690, 944 P.2d 919 (“A motion for a directed verdict challenges the sufficiency of the evidence[.]”). A sufficiency of the evidence review involves a two-step process. Initially, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Then the appellate court must make a legal determination of “whether the evidence viewed in this manner could justify a finding by any rational trier of fact that each element of the crime charged has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.” *State v. Apodaca*, 1994-NMSC-121, ¶ 6, 118 N.M. 762, 887 P.2d 756 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{4} The elements of the offenses were set out in the jury instructions. [RP CR-363 at 218; RP CR-417 at 168-73] In support of the aggravated battery charge, the State presented evidence that Defendant lured the victim to the front of the vehicle Defendant was driving, at which time Defendant “floored it.” [MIO 2; DS 3] Victim jumped onto the hood of the car, and then was thrown onto the street, suffering injury. [MIO 2; DS 3-4] The State also presented testimony from an officer concerning physical evidence that corroborated Victim’s story. [DS 4]

{5} With respect to the charges in CR-417, the State presented evidence that Defendant refused to stop her vehicle when an officer located her and activated his lights. [DS 4] When she did stop, the officer noticed that Defendant smelled of alcohol, had slurred speech, and that there was an open container of alcohol in her vehicle. [DS 5] Defendant would not reveal her identity and refused to consent to testing after the officer attempted to read her the informed consent act. [DS 5] Our calendar notice proposed to hold that this evidence was sufficient to support the charges in CR-417.

{6} In her memorandum in opposition, Defendant refers us to possible discrepancies in the evidence or alternative inferences that could be derived from the evidence. [MIO 2-5] However, as we noted above, on appeal we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. In addition, the jury was free to reject Defendant’s testimony [MIO 3] that it was an accident. *State v. Rojo*, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 19, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829. Finally, to the extent that Defendant is challenging the basis for the stop [MIO 5-6], Defendant did not raise this issue in her docketing statement [DS 8], and has not established that the issue was preserved or is otherwise viable. See Rule 12-208(F) NMRA.

{7} For the reasons set forth above, we affirm.

{8} **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge

WE CONCUR:

STEPHEN G. FRENCH, Judge

EMIL J. KIEHNE, Judge