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WEISNER V. SAN JUAN COUNTY

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KENT M. WEISNER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

SAN JUAN COUNTY NM BOARD
OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS and
OFFICE OF COUNTY CLERK,
Defendant-Appellee.

No. 31,832

COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO

March 14, 2012


APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY, Judge Thomas J. Hynes, District Judge

COUNSEL

Kent M.Weisner, Kirtland, NM, Pro se Appellant

Douglas A. Echols, Aztec, NM, for Appellee

JUDGES

TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge. WE CONCUR: MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge, LINDA M. VANZI, Judge

AUTHOR: TIMOTHY L. GARCIA

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GARCIA, Judge.

Plaintiff is appealing, pro se, from a district court order dismissing his complaint. We issued a calendar notice proposing to dismiss. Plaintiff has responded with a memorandum in opposition. Not persuaded by Plaintiff’s arguments, we dismiss the appeal.

Plaintiff is appealing from a district court order dismissing his complaint. The judgment was filed on December 1, 2011. [RP 63] On December 7, 2011, Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider that order. [RP 64] Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from the underlying order on December 1, 2011. [RP 67] There is no indication in the record proper that the district court ruled on Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider, and Plaintiff’s memorandum in opposition indicates that no ruling has been entered. The district court was required to rule on the post-judgment motion and it was not deemed denied by the passage of time. See Rule 1-059(E) NMRA; Albuquerque Redi-Mix, Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 2007-NMSC-051, ¶ 15, 142 N.M. 527, 168 P.3d 99 (holding that a Rule 1-059(E) motion is not subject to automatic denial). Thus, we conclude that Plaintiff’s appeal is premature without an order denying his motion. See generally Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison, 113 N.M. 231, 236, 824 P.2d 1033, 1038 (1992) (discussing principles of finality).

For these reasons, we dismiss Plaintiff’s appeal as premature.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge

WE CONCUR:

MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge

LINDA M. VANZI, Judge

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