Court of Appeals of New Mexico

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-39737

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

UBALDO ZAYASACURIA,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE METROPOLITANCOURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Yvette K. Gonzales, Metropolitan Court Judge

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General

Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender

Allison H. Jaramillo, Assistant Appellate Defender

Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ATTREP, Judge.

{1}       Defendant has appealed his convictions for DWI and speeding. We previously issued a notice of proposed summary disposition in which we proposed to uphold the convictions. Defendant has filed a memorandum in opposition. After due consideration, we remain unpersuaded. We therefore affirm.

{2}       The relevant background information and legal principles have previously been set forth. We will avoid undue reiteration here, and focus instead on the content of the memorandum in opposition.

{3}       Defendant continues to argue that the metropolitan court erred in rejecting his defense of duress. [MIO 4-7] As we previously indicated, [CN 2] this amounts to a substantial evidence challenge, which entails the application of a highly deferential standard of review. See State v. Rios, 1999-NMCA-069, ¶¶ 22, 24, 127 N.M. 334, 980 P.2d 1068 (addressing a similar situation, and reviewing for substantial evidence). In this context, we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Id. ¶ 24.

{4}       Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the decision rendered below, as we must, see id., we perceive no basis for second-guessing the metropolitan court’s determination that Defendant had reasonable legal alternatives to continuing to drive while intoxicated. This is fundamentally a factual determination, premised upon reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. “[A]s a reviewing court, we do not reweigh the evidence or attempt to draw alternative inferences from the evidence.” State v. Estrada, 2001-NMCA-034, ¶ 41, 130 N.M. 358, 24 P.3d 793.

{5}       In closing, we once again acknowledge the fact that the evidence might have supported a different result. [CN 3] However, as we previously observed, [CN 3-4] the metropolitan court was not required to adopt Defendant’s view of the situation, or to ultimately credit his claim of duress. See, e.g., Rios, 1999-NMCA-069, ¶¶ 24-28 (similarly holding that substantial evidence supported a conviction for DWI, despite the defendant’s prima facie showing in relation to his claim of duress).

{6}       Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the notice of proposed summary disposition and above, we affirm.

{7}       IT IS SO ORDERED.

JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Judge

WE CONCUR:

KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge

ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge