Court of Appeals of New Mexico

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-40145

BARRY GREEN, ESQ., as Personal

Representative of the WRONGFUL DEATH

ESTATE URAH LEE HODGE, Deceased,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CLOVIS HEALTHCARE AND REHABILITATION

CENTER, LLC d/b/a CLOVIS HEALTHCARE AND

REHABILITATION CENTER a/k/a CLOVIS

HEALTHCARE AND REHABILITATION CENTER

LLC and CLOVIS HC AND REHAB CENTER;

SUMMIT CARE, LLC; SUMMIT CARE PARENT,

LLC; FC-GEN OPERATIONS INVESTMENT, LLC;

GEN OPERATIONS I, LLC; GEN OPERATIONS, II,

LLC; GENESIS HEALTHCARE, INC.; GENESIS

HEALTHCARE LLC; SKILLED HEALTHCARE, LLC;

SUN HEALTHCARE GROUP, INC.; SUNDANCE

REHABILITATION HOLDCO, INC.; and GENESIS

ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES LLC,

Defendants-Appellants.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY
Kathleen McGarry Ellenwood, District Court Judge

Pitman, Kalkhoff, Sicula & Dentice, SC

Jeffrey A. Pitman

Benjamin E. Reyes

Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A.

Jocelyn Drennan

Denise Chanez

Patrick Coronel

Albuquerque, NM

for Appellants

DECISION

HANISEE, Judge.

{1}       This matter is on appeal from the district court’s order denying Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration in favor of Plaintiff, the personal representative of the wrongful death estate of Urah Hodge. Defendants argue that the district court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration on grounds of substantive unconscionability because the court lacked the authority to make threshold arbitrability determinations.

{2}       We have carefully reviewed the briefs, applicable law, and arguments made by the parties. We have reviewed the entire record, including the district court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration. This case presents nearly identical underlying claims, arbitration agreements, and arguments as our recently decided case Green v. Peak Medical Farmington, LLC, A-1-CA-40157, mem. op. (N.M. Ct. App. July 13, 2023) (nonprecedential).^[1] Accordingly, we find that this case may be resolved under the same authority and rationale as Green.

{3}       “Arbitration agreements are a species of contract, subject to the principles of New Mexico contract law.” L.D. Miller Constr., Inc. v. Kirschenbaum, 2017-NMCA-030, ¶ 18, 392 P.3d 194. “Contract interpretation is a matter of law that we review de novo.” Rivera v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 2011-NMSC-033, ¶ 27, 150 N.M. 398, 259 P.3d 803.

{4}       We conclude that the district court erred in denying the motion to compel under the same precedent, authority, and rationale explained in Green. As in Green, this case presents an arbitration agreement that evidences a clear and unmistakable intent to arbitrate threshold issues, and the Hodge estate failed to raise a specific challenge to the delegation clause that renders the clause unenforceable. See Juarez v. THI of N.M. at Sunset Villa, LLC, 2022-NMCA-056, ¶ 22, 517 P.3d 918 (“Our inquiry, then, turns on two questions: (1) [W]as there a clear and unmistakable agreement to arbitrate arbitrability? and (2) [D]id the challenger mount a ‘specific challenge’ to that agreement?” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). Answering only the first question affirmatively, we reverse and remand with instructions to submit the case to arbitration.

{5}       IT IS SO ORDERED.

J. MILES HANISEE, Judge

WE CONCUR:

JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge

KATHERINE A. WRAY, Judge