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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number:

Filing Date: February 12, 2026

NO. S-1-SC-40418

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BRYLAND SKEETS,

Defendant-Appellee.

INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF MCKINLEY COUNTY

Louis E. DePauli Jr., District Judge

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General

Santa Fe, NM

Walter M. Hart III, Assistant Solicitor General

Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender

Kimberly M. Chavez Cook, Appellate Defender

Mary Barket, Assistant Appellate Defender

Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

OPINION

ZAMORA, Justice.

{1}                Defendant Bryland Skeets was charged with an open count of murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. After a preliminary hearing, the district court found that the charges were not supported by probable cause. The State appeals to this Court.

{2}                Defendant argues that we lack jurisdiction to decide the State’s appeal of the no probable cause finding. The State argues that jurisdiction is appropriate under NMSA 1978, Section 39-3-3(B)(1) (1972). Section 39-3-3(B)(1) provides, “In any criminal proceeding in district court an appeal may be taken by the state to the [S]upreme [C]ourt or [C]ourt of [A]ppeals, as appellate jurisdiction may be vested by law in these [C]ourts . . . within thirty days from a decision, judgment or order dismissing a complaint, indictment or information as to any one or more counts.”

{3}                We conclude that we lack jurisdiction. Under this Court’s unchallenged precedent, State v. Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, 138 N.M. 441, 121 P.3d 1040, Section 39-3-3(B)(1) applies only to final orders. The district court’s order discharging Defendant for lack of probable cause to support the State’s charges is not a final, appealable order because the State has recourse other than an appeal: it may refile the charges by criminal information or bring the charges before a grand jury. Nor does the district court’s order invoke the doctrine of practical finality because the probable cause issue raised by the State is not unreviewable as a practical matter. The State can simply refile the charges.

{4}                Because we lack jurisdiction to hear this case, we do not address the merits of the State’s other arguments and dismiss this appeal.

I.                  BACKGROUND

{5}                Defendant was charged in connection with a stabbing at a gas station in Gallup, New Mexico, on February 4, 2023, which resulted in the death of Shawn Kinlicheenie. On February 6, 2023, the State filed a criminal complaint in magistrate court against Defendant, charging him with open counts of murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Two days later, the magistrate court transferred the case to district court, which became the court of record.

{6}                After a March 3, 2023, preliminary hearing, the district court found that Defendant’s charges were not supported by probable cause. Three days later, the district court filed an order restating the finding of no probable cause and discharging Defendant from both counts.

{7}                On March 15, 2023, the State appealed to our Court of Appeals, which requested transfer to this Court pursuant to State v. Smallwood. See 2007-NMSC-005, ¶ 11, 141 N.M. 178, 152 P.3d 821 (stating that the Legislature intended the New Mexico Supreme Court “to have jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals in situations where a defendant may possibly be sentenced to life imprisonment or death”). We accepted transfer on June 10, 2024.

II.               DISCUSSION

{8}                The State argues there was probable cause to support the charges against Defendant and that the appropriate standard of review of a district court’s finding of no probable cause is de novo. In response, Defendant argues that the State had no right to appeal the district court’s probable cause finding and, therefore, this Court is without jurisdiction to decide this case. The State counters that Section 39-3-3(B)(1) establishes jurisdiction for the State’s appeal under the facts of this case.^[1] We conclude that we do not have jurisdiction under Section 39-3-3(B)(1) because that statute applies to final orders, and the district court’s order is neither final nor invokes the doctrine of practical finality. We explain below.

A.               Standard of Review

{9}                We review questions of jurisdiction and statutory interpretation de novo. Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 6 (stating that we review questions of jurisdiction de novo); State v. Nick R., 2009-NMSC-050, ¶ 11, 147 N.M. 182, 218 P.3d 868 (stating that we review questions of statutory construction de novo).

B.                Section 39-3-3(B)(1) Does Not Vest This Court with Jurisdiction to Review the District Court’s Order

{10}            A preliminary hearing is a judicial proceeding “at the threshold of [a] criminal prosecution at which guilt or innocence is not definitively determined.” State v. Ayon, 2023-NMSC-025, ¶ 17, 538 P.3d 66. The primary purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine whether the state has met its constitutional burden to demonstrate probable cause before bringing a defendant to trial for a serious criminal offense. Id. ¶¶ 16-17; see also State v. Lopez, 2013-NMSC-047, ¶ 2, 314 P.3d 236 (“Under Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution, a defendant may not be brought to trial for a serious criminal offense unless there first has been a determination of probable cause, either by a grand jury or by a judge at a preliminary examination.”). The preliminary hearing “operates as a screening device to prevent hasty and unwise prosecutions and to save an innocent accused from the humiliation and anxiety of a public prosecution.” State ex rel. Whitehead v. Vescovi-Dial, 1997-NMCA-126, ¶ 6, 124 N.M. 375, 950 P.2d 818; see also Ayon, 2023-NMSC-025, ¶ 24 (quoting the Vescovi-Dial Court’s reasoning with approval).

{11}            The statute at issue—Section 39-3-3(B)(1)—provides that the state may appeal in a criminal case “from a decision, judgment or order dismissing a complaint, indictment or information as to any one or more counts.” Under the established precedent of this Court, this statute applies to final orders. Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 8 (“Section 39-3-3(B) recognizes the [s]tate’s right to appeal from final orders of the district court.”); see also State v. Benedict, S-1-SC-39240, dispositional order ¶ 7 (N.M. Aug. 29, 2024) (nonprecedential) (“[G]enerally, an appellate court can only review final judgments, interlocutory orders which practically dispose of the merits of an action, and final orders after entry of judgment which affect substantial rights.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Ahasteen, 1998-NMCA-158, ¶ 10, 126 N.M. 238, 968 P.2d 328, abrogated on other grounds by, State v. Savedra, 2010-NMSC-025, ¶¶ 3, 8, 148 N.M. 301, 236 P.3d 20)).^[2]

{12}            The State argues that this Court has jurisdiction to review the district court’s order under the plain language of Section 39-3-3(B)(1), which provides that a district court order “dismissing a complaint . . . as to any one or more counts” may be appealed. The order at issue “discharged” Defendant with regard to both counts for lack of probable cause; this, contends the State, is a dismissal for the purpose of Section 39-3-3(B)(1). But the State does not challenge our conclusion in Heinsen that Section 39-3-3(B)(1) applies to final orders; in fact, the State does not address or even cite Heinsen. We decline to revisit our established precedent. The determinative question, therefore, is whether the district court’s order is a final order for the purpose of Section 39-3-3(B)(1).

{13}            We conclude that it is not. “As a general rule, an order or judgment is not considered final unless it resolves all of the factual and legal issues before the court and completely disposes of the case.” Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 14. In this case, as in Benedict, the record does not establish—nor does the State argue—that it is foreclosed “substantively or procedurally from the options of 1) filing a new criminal information . . . or 2) pursu[ing] a grand jury indictment.” Benedict, S-1-SC-39240, dispositional order ¶ 8; see also Herrera v. Sanchez, 2014-NMSC-018, ¶ 14, 328 P.3d 1176 (“To obtain [the neutral determination of probable cause required to prosecute a felony], the district attorney may either present the case to a grand jury and seek an indictment or proceed with a preliminary examination before a judge and file a criminal information if the judge finds probable cause to prosecute.”); Rule 5-201 NMRA (providing that the state may commence a prosecution by filing a complaint, an information, or an indictment). There is no double jeopardy bar preventing the State from refiling the charges in this case. See State v. Baca, 2015-NMSC-021, ¶ 46, 352 P.3d 1151 (“Constitutional jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when a jury is impaneled and sworn to hear a case and in a bench trial when the trial judge first starts hearing evidence.”). The district court’s order has not completely disposed of the case because the State has numerous available options to restart the nascent prosecution of either or both charges at the district court level. Because the district court’s order has not completely disposed of the case, it is not final. See Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 14.

{14}            The State argues in the alternative that, “were this case not to come within the plain ‘dismissing’ language of Section 39-3-3(B)(1),” then “the doctrine of practical finality . . . would provide appellate jurisdiction.” We disagree. The practical finality doctrine is an “exception to the final judgment rule” that we apply “cautiously, in limited circumstances.” Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, ¶¶ 1, 15. The doctrine applies where “an order effectively disposes of the issues in a case, even though supplementary proceedings are necessary to enforce the order” and—more relevant here—“where, as a practical matter, the issue raised on appeal will not be available for review if the state is deprived of an immediate appeal.” Id. ¶ 15 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{15}            The State contends that we applied the wrong practical finality standard—a civil rather than a criminal standard—in the Benedict dispositional order, and that the correct standard is whether an order is “a concluding decision that ends the life of the case before the court.” Under that standard, argues the State, the order is practically final. But, unlike Heinsen, the three cases on which the State primarily relies to develop its practical finality standard are from the Court of Appeals: State v. Griego, 2004-NMCA-107, 136 N.M. 272, 96 P.3d 1192; State v. Ahasteen, 1998-NMCA-158; and State v. Armijo, 1994-NMCA-136, 118 N.M. 802, 887 P.2d 1269. Those cases predate Heinsen, on which we rely for the practical finality standard above and which also undergirds Benedict. Moreover, Heinsen is a criminal case decided by this Court and therefore precedential. Because Heinsen controls, we reject the practical finality standard proposed by the State and abrogate Griego, 2004-NMCA-107; Ahasteen, 1998-NMCA-158; and Armijo, 1994-NMCA-136, inasmuch as they conflict with our holding in this case.

{16}            Under the appropriate standard from Heinsen—which is whether a court’s decision effectively disposes of the issues in a case—the order of the district court is not practically final. See 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 15. As discussed above, the district court’s probable cause determination is not practically final because the State can refile the charges and again present evidence of probable cause at a preliminary hearing or to a grand jury.

{17}            This case is somewhat similar to Heinsen. We held in Heinsen that the practical finality exception did not apply to the state’s appeal of a magistrate court suppression order because by dismissing “some or all of the charges in the magistrate court . . . and refiling in the district court for a trial de novo,” the state had the opportunity to start the case over and again present its evidence. 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 1. We have found an issue practically final when the state would be precluded from continuing prosecution, thereby ending judicial review of an issue. See Collado v. N.M. Motor Vehicle Div., 2005-NMCA-056, ¶¶ 1-6, 137 N.M. 442, 112 P.3d 303 (explaining that the doctrine of practical finality provided appellate jurisdiction to review a remand order because the outcome of the proceedings in the magistrate court—conviction or acquittal—could preclude future consideration of the issues raised by the Motor Vehicle Division in its appeal). Here, because the State can refile and seek a probable cause finding by obtaining a new preliminary hearing or bringing the case before a grand jury, the issue is not practically final. We decline to apply the practical finality exception to the order of the district court.

{18}            We note that the State’s proposed alternative rule—that it can appeal a district court finding of no probable cause even where it has alternative options to obtain a neutral determination of probable cause—would lead to significant delay in the administration of justice. This very case provides a clear illustration of the delay caused by taking the appellate path to review findings of no probable cause. The alleged homicide was committed on February 4, 2023. The district court issued its order finding that the charges against Defendant were unsupported by probable cause on March 6, 2023, and the State appealed on March 15, 2023. Had the State filed a new criminal information, the district court would have been required to hold a preliminary hearing within ten days of that filing if Defendant was in custody, and sixty days if not in custody. Rule 5-302(A)(1) NMRA. Instead, it is now approximately three years since the State filed its appeal. Delay runs counter to a core purpose of a preliminary hearing, which is to screen out “hasty and unwise prosecutions and to save an innocent accused from the humiliation and anxiety of a public prosecution.” Ayon, 2023-NMSC-025, ¶ 24. Moreover, this significant delay at the outset of a prosecution is a disservice to both the state and defendants—i.e., a disservice to the interests of justice—because the delay compromises the availability and recollection of witnesses. The State offers no compelling reason why the appellate path is preferable to a readily available, more efficient, alternative path for a probable cause determination. We conclude that the better path is the one which serves the timely administration of justice.

{19}            We are not alone in this approach. For example, the Supreme Court of Idaho declined to “allow[] appeals from a dismissal of a complaint” when interpreting a state rule that provided for an appeal to the district court from a magistrate’s “‘order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint.’” State v. Ruiz, 678 P.2d 1109, 1110-11 (Idaho 1984) (citation omitted); see also State v. Loomis, 201 P.3d 1277 (Idaho 2009). Reasoning that the state “could have simply filed another complaint with another magistrate, in effect having its assertion of error resolved in a new preliminary hearing,” it rejected the state’s proposed approach, which would have entailed “unjustifiable delay” and increased appellate caseloads. Ruiz, 678 P.2d at 1110.

{20}            The Supreme Court of Minnesota took a similar approach when it interpreted a state statute providing that “[i]n criminal cases the state may appeal . . . [f]rom an order, the substantive effect of which is to dismiss an indictment, information or complaint.” State v. Maki, 192 N.W.2d 811, 811 (Minn. 1971) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It held that the provision was “intended to give the state the right to appeal under circumstances where the order appealed from effectively defeats or prevents successful prosecutive action against the defendant,” and not to provide the state “the right to appeal every time a magistrate dismisses a complaint.” Id. at 812 (emphasis added). The Maki court further reasoned that the magistrate’s dismissal of the complaint at issue was not subject to immediate appeal because the prosecution could pursue the charges by “presenting [the charges] to another magistrate or . . . to a grand jury for indictment.” Id. at 812. Although Ruiz and Maki interpreted slightly different provisions of law than Section 39-3-3(B)(1), the approach of those courts is clearly congruent with ours.

{21}            In sum, we conclude that the order of the district court appealed to us by the State is neither final nor practically final, and therefore Section 39-3-3(B)(1) does not provide us with jurisdiction to decide the merits of the appeal.

III.           CONCLUSION

{22}            For the reasons stated, we hold that we lack jurisdiction to hear this case and, accordingly, dismiss this appeal. We abrogate Griego, 2004-NMCA-107; Ahasteen, 1998-NMCA-158; and Armijo, 1994-NMCA-136, inasmuch as they conflict with our holding in this case.

{23}            IT IS SO ORDERED.

BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice

WE CONCUR:

DAVID K. THOMSON, Chief Justice

MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice

C. SHANNON BACON, Justice

JULIE J. VARGAS, Justice