This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
- The Defendant was convicted of attempted first-degree murder following a no contest plea and was sentenced to nine years in prison and two years of parole. The contention arises from the imposition of a mandatory seventy-five dollar fee for crime victims reparation, which the Defendant challenges based on her indigency (para 1).
Procedural History
- Appeal from the District Court of Doña Ana County, Fernando R. Macias, District Judge, April 5, 2017: Convicted of attempted first-degree murder and sentenced to nine years in prison and two years of parole.
Parties' Submissions
- Appellant (Defendant): Contends that the imposition of the mandatory seventy-five dollar fee for crime victims reparation is unjust due to her indigency. Argues that the issue is ripe for review because the judgment and sentence ordered her to pay fees without mentioning alternatives or a payment plan. Claims that the fee constitutes fundamental error or results from ineffective assistance of counsel, as her plea agreement did not mention the fee and she is unable to pay it (paras 2-3).
- Appellee (State): [Not applicable or not found]
Legal Issues
- Whether the challenge to the mandatory seventy-five dollar fee for crime victims reparation is ripe for review.
- Whether the imposition of the fee constitutes fundamental error or results from ineffective assistance of counsel.
Disposition
- The motion to amend the docketing statement to add a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is denied.
- The appeal challenging the imposition of the mandatory seventy-five dollar fee for crime victims reparation is affirmed (para 8).
Reasons
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The Court, consisting of Judges Timothy L. Garcia, Jonathan B. Sutin, and M. Monica Zamora, unanimously decided to affirm the district court's judgment and sentence. The Court found that the Defendant's challenge to the fee is not ripe for review, as she did not demonstrate that a demand for payment has been made or that she would not be afforded alternatives due to her indigency. The Court also held that the statute levying the fee is mandatory for persons convicted of felonies and must be imposed at sentencing, indicating that the prosecutor's waiver of the fee, if any, was not binding on the district court. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not supported by the record, as there was no imminent due date for the fee that could demonstrate the Defendant's inability to pay, and the record was not sufficiently developed to support a prima facie claim for ineffective assistance of counsel (paras 2-7).
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