AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• The Defendant was convicted in magistrate court and subsequently became a fugitive. During the time the Defendant was a fugitive, his probation term expired. The district court ruled that the Defendant's suspended sentence with probation was tolled while he was a fugitive, allowing the magistrate court authority to revoke his probation after the term had ostensibly expired (para 1).

Procedural History

• [Not applicable or not found]

Parties' Submissions

• Plaintiff-Appellee (State): Argued that the tolling provision applies, allowing the magistrate court the authority to revoke the Defendant's probation even after the probation term had expired due to the Defendant being a fugitive (para 1).
• Defendant-Appellant: Contended that since he was convicted in magistrate court and his probation term had expired by the time he was located for his probation violation, the magistrate court lacked authority to impose any further sentence (para 2).

Legal Issues

• Whether the tolling provision of NMSA 1978, Section 31-21-15(C) (2013), applies to cases in which a defendant’s underlying conviction occurred in magistrate court, thereby allowing the magistrate court authority to revoke probation after the probation term has expired while the defendant was a fugitive.

Disposition

• The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s ruling, holding that the magistrate court lacked authority to impose any further sentence on the Defendant after his probation term had expired (para 4).

Reasons

• Per Michael D. Bustamante, J. (Linda M. Vanzi, J., and J. Miles Hanisee, J., concurring): The Court relied on the precedent set by State v. Begay, which determined that the tolling provision applies only to defendants whose underlying conviction occurred in district court. Since the Defendant was convicted in magistrate court and his probation term had expired by the time he was located for his probation violation, the Court held that he had satisfied his criminal liability and the magistrate court thus lacked authority to impose any further sentence. The Court was unpersuaded by the State's arguments that Begay was wrongly decided and its request to hold the case in abeyance pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings in Begay, citing State v. Jones for the principle that a decision from the Court of Appeals is controlling even when certiorari has been granted by the Supreme Court (paras 2-3).