AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• Neighbors in the Tierra del Sol Subdivision, Curtis and Barbara Myers (Plaintiffs) and Jacqueline Armstrong (Defendant), became embroiled in a legal dispute over Armstrong's dog training and boarding businesses operated from her property. Armstrong opened a dog training business in 2000, added a dog boarding business in 2003, and constructed a 3,000 square foot metal building for these businesses in 2009 without approval from the Architectural Control Committee (ACC), which had been inactive since 1984. The subdivision's restrictive covenants designated lots for residential use only, required ACC approval for all improvements, and prohibited commercial use of dogs (paras 2-4).

Procedural History

• [Not applicable or not found]

Parties' Submissions

• Plaintiffs: Argued that Defendant's businesses and the construction of the metal building without ACC approval violated the subdivision's restrictive covenants (para 4).
• Defendant: Contended that the restrictive covenants were unenforceable in the absence of an ACC, changes in the subdivision undermined the uniformity sought by the covenants, and Plaintiffs had waived their right to enforce the covenants by acquiescence (para 5).

Legal Issues

• Whether the restrictive covenants are unenforceable or void in the absence of an Architectural Control Committee (ACC).
• Whether changes in the subdivision undermine the enforceability of the restrictive covenants.
• Whether Plaintiffs waived their right to enforce the restrictive covenants by acquiescence.

Disposition

• The judgment of the district court, which enjoined Defendant from operating her businesses on the residential property and ordered her to remove or alter the metal building, was affirmed (para 1).

Reasons

• Per WECHSLER, J. (Fry and Garcia, JJ., concurring):
  Lack of an ACC: The court found that the absence of an ACC did not render the restrictive covenants unenforceable. It cited precedent indicating that covenants impose binding obligations and that a court could sit in place of the ACC to enforce explicit prohibitions in the covenants (paras 6-9).
  Changes in the Subdivision: The court held that the evidence did not demonstrate changes so radical as to frustrate the original purpose and intent of the covenants. It distinguished the case from precedent where significant changes had made enforcement of covenants inequitable, noting that only minor and non-commercial violations had occurred in the subdivision besides Defendant's (paras 10-13).
  Plaintiffs’ Acquiescence: The court rejected the argument that Plaintiffs had waived their right to enforce the covenants through acquiescence, noting that previous violations were minor and that the covenants specifically allowed for delayed enforcement. It emphasized that not all breaches of covenants are equal and that Plaintiffs were not required to enforce against minor violations to retain their rights (paras 14-18).