AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• In 2001, the Defendant entered a plea to multiple charges including armed robbery with a firearm enhancement, false imprisonment, second-degree kidnapping, and resisting, evading, or obstructing an officer. After fully serving his sentence and probation by 2014, and being arrested in 2016 for being a felon in possession of a firearm, the Defendant sought to withdraw his plea. He argued that he was not informed of the consequences to his Second Amendment right to bear arms at the time of his plea, claiming this lack of advisement constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and rendered his plea not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary (paras 2, 8).

Procedural History

• Certiorari Denied, April 22, 2020, No. S-1-SC-38194. Released for Publication June 23, 2020.

Parties' Submissions

• Defendant-Appellant: Argued that he was not advised of the loss of his Second Amendment right to bear arms resulting from his plea, constituting ineffective assistance of counsel and rendering the plea not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. He sought to withdraw his plea on these grounds (para 2).
• Plaintiff-Appellee: Contended that the Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea was untimely and that the advisement of Second Amendment rights was not required at the time of the Defendant's plea. Additionally, they argued that the Defendant had not provided sufficient evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel (paras 4-5, 7).

Legal Issues

• Whether the Defendant should be permitted to withdraw his plea based on not being advised of the loss of his Second Amendment rights at the time of the plea.
• Whether the Defendant's coram nobis application was timely.
• Whether the requirement to advise a defendant of the impact of a guilty plea on Second Amendment rights applies retroactively to the Defendant's 2001 plea.

Disposition

• The court affirmed the district court's denial of the Defendant's petition to withdraw his plea (para 1).

Reasons

• Per B. Zamora, J. (Linda M. Vanzi, J., and Jacqueline R. Medina, J., concurring):
  The court held that the decision to allow a defendant to withdraw a plea is discretionary to the trial court, and found no abuse of discretion in this case as the plea was deemed knowingly and voluntarily given (para 3).
  On the issue of timeliness, the court did not resolve which rule applied (Rule 1-060 or Rule 5-803) because the district court ruled on the merits of the coram nobis motion. The court suggested that either rule could apply without affecting the outcome (paras 4-7).
  Regarding the Second Amendment advisement, the court determined that the requirement to advise a defendant of the loss of Second Amendment rights upon a guilty plea did not apply retroactively to the Defendant's 2001 plea. The court referenced the standards for determining retroactivity and concluded that the advisement requirement, first promulgated in 2007, did not constitute a "watershed rule" of criminal procedure nor was it a substantive rule that would apply retroactively to the Defendant's case (paras 8-14).
  The court also addressed the Defendant's due process argument, stating that the trial court is not required to inform defendants of all possible consequences of a guilty plea, distinguishing between direct and collateral consequences. The court concluded that the potential federal prosecution for being a felon in possession of a firearm was a collateral consequence of the Defendant's plea, and thus, the district court had no obligation to advise the Defendant of this consequence in 2001 (paras 15-16).