AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• Alejandro M. (Child) faced charges in two separate cases: one involving a handgun and the other a shotgun. In the handgun case, Child was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, abuse of a child not resulting in death or great bodily harm, larceny of a firearm, tampering with evidence, and aggravated assault with intent to commit a felony. In the shotgun case, Child was charged as a youthful offender for attempt to commit second-degree murder, shooting from a motor vehicle causing great bodily harm, aggravated battery, and two counts of tampering with evidence. ADA Carmela Starace prosecuted both cases. Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct by ADA Starace in the shotgun case led Child to file a motion to disqualify the entire District Attorney’s Office from prosecuting the handgun case, which was partially granted by the district court, disqualifying ADA Starace but not the entire office (paras 2-5).

Procedural History

• [Not applicable or not found]

Parties' Submissions

• Child-Appellant: Argued that the district court erred by not disqualifying the entire District Attorney’s Office after disqualifying ADA Starace, due to the failure of the State to establish an effective screening system to prevent contact between ADA Starace and other members of the office (para 6).
• Plaintiff-Appellee (State): Contended that Child’s appeal was not preserved because his argument at the hearing made no reference to screening mechanisms and that the issue of imputation is moot (para 6).

Legal Issues

• Whether the district court erred in not disqualifying the entire District Attorney’s Office after disqualifying ADA Starace for prosecutorial misconduct (para 1).
• Whether the State met its burden to demonstrate that effective screening between ADA Starace and other members of the District Attorney’s Office had been established (para 12).

Disposition

• The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision, concluding that the disqualification of ADA Starace should be imputed to the entire District Attorney’s Office due to the State’s failure to meet its burden of establishing an appropriate level of screening (para 15).

Reasons

• Majority Opinion by Judge Bogardus, concurred by Chief Judge Hanisee:
  The Court found that Child properly preserved the issue for appeal by arguing in his written motion and at the hearing that the State failed to demonstrate effective screening to alleviate the conflict (para 7).
  The Court applied a two-step analytical framework for disqualifying a prosecutor’s office, first determining if a member of the office is disqualified, then whether the entire office is disqualified by imputation. The State bears the burden to prove effective screening from the disqualified member (paras 9-10).
  The Court concluded that the State did not meet its burden of proof because no evidence was presented regarding screening procedures, thus the disqualification of ADA Starace should be imputed to the entire District Attorney’s Office (paras 11-12).
  The Court rejected the State’s argument that ADA Starace’s departure from the office rendered the issue of screening moot, noting the lack of record evidence about her employment situation and the absence of screening protocols (para 14).
  Dissenting Opinion by Judge Yohalem:
  Judge Yohalem dissented, arguing that the majority misapplied the standard for disqualifying an entire district attorney’s office by requiring screening in every case of individual attorney disqualification. She emphasized the Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales, which does not mandate screening for every ethical violation by a single attorney, and argued that the district court correctly weighed the evidence and competing legal interests (paras 17-23).