AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• In July 2007, during a failed drug transaction, Christopher Franco shot and killed William Healy. The incident occurred outside Franco's apartment as Healy attempted to drive his pickup truck in reverse towards Franco at a high rate of speed. Franco was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, shooting at a motor vehicle resulting in great bodily harm (death), aggravated assault, and tampering with evidence. He received a total sentence of thirty years, with eleven years for the manslaughter conviction and nineteen years for the shooting at a motor vehicle conviction, to be served consecutively (paras 2-3).

Procedural History

• State v. Franco (Franco I), No. 30,028, mem. op. (N.M. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2010) (non-precedential): The Court of Appeals affirmed Franco's convictions and sentencing, relying on State v. Dominguez.
• State v. Franco (Franco II), No. 32,605, order ¶ 5 (N.M. Sup. Ct. June 10, 2013) (non-precedential): The Supreme Court vacated Franco's conviction for voluntary manslaughter based on double jeopardy concerns, following the overruling of Dominguez in State v. Montoya.

Parties' Submissions

• Appellant (Franco): Argued that his convictions and sentences violated double jeopardy in two respects: (1) the charges for shooting at a motor vehicle and voluntary manslaughter should be merged; or (2) the sentence for shooting at a motor vehicle should not have been enhanced (para 3).
• Appellee (State of New Mexico): Contended that the appeal was not properly before the Court for procedural reasons and because the law of the case doctrine should apply. The State also questioned the timeliness of the notice of appeal and suggested that habeas corpus would be a more appropriate remedy (paras 7-8).

Legal Issues

• Whether the Defendant can pursue a second appeal on procedural grounds.
• Whether sentencing under NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-15(A)(4), for shooting at a motor vehicle resulting in a death constitutes double jeopardy.

Disposition

• The Court concluded that the Defendant has a right to appeal and affirmed the sentence (paras 16, 34-35).

Reasons

• Judges: MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, MICHAEL E. VIGIL, JONATHAN B. SUTIN. The Court found that the right to be free from double jeopardy is of constitutional dimension and cannot be waived, allowing the Defendant to raise the defense at any stage of the criminal prosecution (paras 8-12). The Court disagreed with the State's procedural objections and the application of the law of the case doctrine, emphasizing the fundamental nature of double jeopardy protections (paras 13-15). On the substantive issue, the Court disagreed with the Defendant's double jeopardy argument, holding that Section 31-18-15(A)(4) was intended to be the basic sentence for all second degree felonies resulting in death, and thus, the sentencing did not violate double jeopardy principles (paras 17-34).