AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• The Defendant was arrested following a domestic abuse call, leading to charges of criminal sexual penetration in the third degree and misdemeanor battery. After posting bond, the Defendant demanded a speedy trial for both charges. The case experienced multiple delays due to judge reassignments and the Defendant's attorney's scheduling conflict, resulting in a motion to vacate a trial setting. The State did not seek a new trial setting after this motion was granted, leading to a significant delay in the trial date. The Defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on a violation of the right to a speedy trial, which the district court granted (paras 2-4, 13).

Procedural History

• [Not applicable or not found]

Parties' Submissions

• Plaintiff-Appellant (State): Argued that the delay in trial should not be attributed to the State due to the Defendant's attorney's motion to vacate the trial setting and stipulation that the delay would not count against the State in speedy trial determinations (para 13).
• Defendant-Appellee: Contended that the delay violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial, emphasizing that the State took no action to reschedule the trial after the motion to vacate was granted (paras 13, 14).

Legal Issues

• Whether the Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated by a delay of one year, three months, and six days, despite the Defendant's attorney's motion to vacate a trial setting due to a scheduling conflict and stipulation that the delay would not count against the State (para 1).

Disposition

• The district court's decision to dismiss the criminal information with prejudice on grounds that the Defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated is affirmed (para 26).

Reasons

• The Court, with an opinion authored by Judge Michael E. Vigil and concurrence from Judges Michael D. Bustamante and J. Miles Hanisee, held that the delay in the trial was presumptively prejudicial and that the reasons for the delay, particularly the State's inaction after the Defendant's motion to vacate the trial setting, weighed heavily against the State. The Court found that the Defendant had adequately asserted his right to a speedy trial and that the State's failure to act constituted inexcusable neglect. Despite the lack of a particularized showing of prejudice by the Defendant, the Court concluded that the violation of the right to a speedy trial warranted dismissal of the case. The analysis was based on the Barker v. Wingo factors, emphasizing the excessive length of the delay and the State's responsibility for it (paras 5-25).