AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• The Defendant was sentenced for crimes committed while he was not serving another sentence. He challenged the district court's authority to impose consecutive sentences under these circumstances.

Procedural History

• [Not applicable or not found]

Parties' Submissions

• Defendant-Appellant: Argued that the district court lacked statutory authority to order a consecutive sentence because the only section of New Mexico’s Criminal Sentencing Act dealing with consecutive sentencing applies only to “inmates and persons at large,” and he fit neither description at the time of his offense (para 2).
• Plaintiff-Appellee: Supported the district court's decision, referencing a prior court opinion (Deats v. State) that affirmed the authority of district courts to impose either concurrent or consecutive sentences pursuant to common law practice, which was codified by the Legislature (para 2).

Legal Issues

• Whether district courts in New Mexico have the authority to impose consecutive sentences for crimes committed by individuals who are not currently serving another sentence.

Disposition

• The appeal was affirmed, upholding the district court's judgment and sentence (para 6).

Reasons

• The Court, consisting of Chief Judge J. Miles Hanisee, Judge Jennifer L. Attrep, and Judge Kristina Bogardus, unanimously affirmed the district court's decision. The Court was unpersuaded by the Defendant's arguments, referencing the Deats v. State decision, which clarified that district courts have the discretion to impose either concurrent or consecutive sentences, a discretion that was codified by the Legislature in NMSA 1978, Section 38-1-3 (1915). The Court found no conflict with other opinions and noted that Section 31-18-21 of the Criminal Sentencing Act does not withdraw this discretionary authority but rather specifies circumstances under which sentencing will be consecutive, thereby not rendering Section 38-1-3 surplusage but instead reversing the common law presumption of concurrent sentencing in specific situations (paras 2-5).