AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• The Defendant was convicted under the Family Violence Protection Act for violating a temporary order of protection against his ex-girlfriend, Andrea Reed. The order prohibited the Defendant from being within specific distances of Ms. Reed's home, school, workplace, and her person in public places. Despite this, the Defendant went to a bar where he and Ms. Reed had previously frequented, encountered her there, and refused to leave immediately when informed of her presence and her intention to call the police, leading to his arrest and conviction.

Procedural History

• [Not applicable or not found]

Parties' Submissions

• Defendant-Appellant: Argued that the district court erred by refusing his requested jury instruction, which included the element that he “knowingly” violated the order of protection. Contended that if the statute does not include "knowingly" as an element, it is void for vagueness. Also argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that imposing a criminal penalty for violation of an ex parte order of protection violates due process.
• Plaintiff-Appellee: [Not applicable or not found]

Legal Issues

• Whether the district court’s refusal of the Defendant's requested jury instruction, which included the element that he “knowingly” violated the order of protection, was reversible error.
• Whether Section 40-13-6(D), (F) is void for vagueness if it does not include “knowingly” as an element.
• Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant's conviction.
• Whether imposing a criminal penalty for violation of an ex parte order of protection violates due process.

Disposition

• The Court of Appeals affirmed the Defendant's conviction and sentence.

Reasons

• The Court, per Judge Timothy L. Garcia with Judges Michael D. Bustamante and Cynthia A. Fry concurring, held that:
  The statute does not require that a person "knowingly" violate an order of protection, as the Legislature did not include such language in Section 40-13-6(D), (F). The court reasoned that it would not read into the statute language that is not there, especially when the statute makes sense as written.
  The Defendant's argument that the statute is void for vagueness was rejected. The court found that the statute gave the Defendant a fair opportunity to determine that his conduct was prohibited and that the statute is not so lacking in standards that its enforcement would be subjective and ad hoc.
  The evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant's conviction. The court noted that the Defendant did not dispute the essential elements of the crime and that the jury was free to reject his version of the incident.
  The court declined to address the Defendant's due process argument, as he did not state how he preserved this issue below or why it need not be preserved.