AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• The Defendant was convicted for possession of a visual medium of sexual exploitation involving a child under thirteen. During the execution of a search warrant at his home, officers obtained the Defendant's cell phone, which he voluntarily handed over after being asked by an officer. The Defendant later contended that his consent to surrender the cell phone was not voluntary but was a result of acquiescence to a coercive show of authority by the officers.

Procedural History

• [Not applicable or not found]

Parties' Submissions

• Defendant-Appellant: Argued that the consent given to turn over his cell phone to the officers was not voluntary but was instead an acquiescence to a coercive show of authority. The Defendant likened the circumstances of his case to those in previous cases where consent was deemed involuntary due to coercive police conduct.
• Plaintiff-Appellee: [Not applicable or not found]

Legal Issues

• Whether the Defendant's consent to turn over his cell phone to the officers was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.

Disposition

• The Court affirmed the district court’s judgment and sentence, convicting the Defendant of possession of visual medium of sexual exploitation (child under thirteen).

Reasons

• Per MEGAN P. DUFFY, J. (J. MILES HANISEE and KATHERINE A. WRAY, JJ., concurring):
  The Court was not persuaded by the Defendant's analogy to previous cases where consent was deemed involuntary due to coercive police conduct. It distinguished the current case from those precedents, noting that the Defendant and his father were treated respectfully by the officers, there was no use of force or coercive tactics, and the Defendant voluntarily handed over his cell phone without hesitation or coercion. The Court found the facts more analogous to a case where consent was deemed voluntary despite the presence of officers and the potential for coercion. It emphasized that lawful, non-coercive police activity does not in itself constitute duress that makes consent involuntary. The Court also noted that the police had the authority to temporarily detain a resident during searches conducted pursuant to a search warrant and that the Defendant had not shown that his will was overborne by the officers' conduct. Therefore, the Court affirmed the conviction, concluding that the Defendant's consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances (paras 1-9).