AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• In 1947, Nicolas and Maria Bazan de Chavez transferred Lot 41-G to Alfredo A. Chavez with a provision that if the property is sold, the heirs or sons and daughters of Nicolas Chavez and Maria Bazan de Chavez would have the first option to purchase the property. Georgia M. Chavez and Ron Chavez, descendants of the original grantors, contended that the estate of Alfredo Alfonso “Fecho” Chavez sold the lot to a third party without offering them the first option to purchase, contrary to the deed's provision.

Procedural History

• [Not applicable or not found]

Parties' Submissions

• Appellants: Argued that the 1947 Warranty Deed required the estate to offer the first option to purchase the disputed property to the appellants before selling to a third party. They contended that the provision should apply to the estate and run with the land, aiming to keep the property within the family.
• Estate: Argued that the right of first refusal only applied to the original grantee and not to the estate. They also contended that the provision was an unreasonable restraint on alienation due to its lack of specificity regarding the procedure or period governing the right of first refusal.

Legal Issues

• Whether the 1947 Warranty Deed required the estate to extend the right of first refusal to the appellants before selling the disputed property.
• Whether the appellants' proposed right of first refusal would constitute an unreasonable restriction on alienation.

Disposition

• The district court's order dismissing the appellants' complaint for failure to state a claim was affirmed.

Reasons

• The Court of Appeals, with Judge Timothy L. Garcia authoring the opinion and Judges Michael D. Bustamante and Linda M. Vanzi concurring, held that the provision in the 1947 Warranty Deed did not require the estate to extend the right of first refusal to the appellants. The court applied a de novo standard of review and concluded that the provision was expressly limited to the original grantee and did not apply to the estate or restrict the sale of the lot by the grantee's heirs. The court reasoned that the provision constituted a restraint on alienation subject to strict construction and found no ambiguity in the deed that would necessitate looking beyond its plain language to interpret the parties' intentions. The court also declined to address whether applying the deed restriction to the grantee's heirs would create an unreasonable restriction on alienation, as the primary issue was resolved in favor of the estate.