This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
- The Defendant was stopped by Deputy Seely for a traffic violation while towing a van. After the initial stop, the Defendant was released but was stopped again shortly after by Deputy Seely to investigate the ownership of the van being towed. This second stop led to the Defendant entering a conditional plea to unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, challenging the constitutionality of the second stop and the search of a receipt book found during the stop (paras 2-5).
Procedural History
- Traffic violations from the first stop were charged separately and resulted in a conviction in magistrate court, which was later acquitted after a de novo trial in district court (para 6).
- The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the contents of the receipt book, which was denied by the district court (para 7).
- The Defendant entered a conditional plea, reserving the right to appeal the district court's orders (para 8).
Parties' Submissions
- Defendant: Argued that the van was not a "vehicle" within the Motor Vehicle Code definition, contested the constitutionality of the second stop and the search of the receipt book, and insisted on the suppression of all evidence obtained as a result of the second stop or, alternatively, all contents of the receipt book aside from the receipt for the van (paras 9, 22-23).
- State: Urged that sufficient attenuation existed between the stops to justify admitting evidence obtained during the second stop and argued that the van satisfies the definition of "vehicle" under the Code (paras 9, 27-28).
Legal Issues
- Whether the second stop and the search of the receipt book were constitutionally justified.
- Whether evidence obtained during the second stop should be suppressed under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.
- Whether the van qualifies as a "vehicle" or "motor vehicle" under the Motor Vehicle Code.
Disposition
- The court found sufficient attenuation between the first and second stop to not suppress evidence obtained from the second stop, except for the contents of the receipt book beyond the specific receipt for the van, which was deemed an impermissible expansion of the scope of Defendant's consent (para 31).
- The court affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion regarding the definition of "vehicle" under the Motor Vehicle Code, leaving it as a matter for the jury to decide (para 30).
Reasons
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RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge (MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge, TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge concurring): Concluded that the second stop was sufficiently attenuated from the first due to intervening circumstances, such as the Defendant's release and departure before the second stop. However, the search of the entire receipt book exceeded the limited scope of Defendant's consent, which was only for the receipt related to the van. The court also held that the definition of "vehicle" or "motor vehicle" under the Motor Vehicle Code is a factual issue to be determined by the jury (paras 10-31).
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