AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• The Defendant, David Warner, created a non-profit foundation in memory of his son and solicited funds by distributing flyers at a public street intersection in the Village of Ruidoso, New Mexico. His actions led to his arrest and conviction for soliciting without a permit as per the Village's ordinances (para 1).

Procedural History

• Municipal Court: Convicted the Defendant of soliciting without a permit contrary to Ruidoso, N.M., Code of Ordinances ch. 58, art. III, § 58-84(b) (1998).
• District Court of Lincoln County: Upheld the conviction in a de novo appeal.

Parties' Submissions

• Defendant-Appellant: Argued that Section 58-84(b) of the Ruidoso Code of Ordinances, either alone or in combination with related sections, is constitutionally deficient on the grounds of overbreadth, prior restraint, and vagueness (para 4).
• Plaintiff-Appellee: [Not applicable or not found]

Legal Issues

• Whether Section 58-84(b) of the Ruidoso Code of Ordinances, alone or in combination with related sections, is unconstitutional on the grounds of overbreadth, prior restraint, and vagueness (para 4).

Disposition

• The Court of Appeals of New Mexico reversed the Defendant's conviction (para 23).

Reasons

• Per Jonathan B. Sutin, with concurrence from Celia Foy Castillo, Chief Judge, and Cynthia A. Fry, Judge:
  The court found Section 58-84(b) of the Ruidoso Code of Ordinances, which criminalizes solicitation on public property without a permit, to be a clear infringement on First Amendment rights unless other laws or Village council authorization could render it constitutionally valid (paras 14-15).
  The related ordinances (Sections 26-62, 26-75, and 26-77) were considered in the constitutional analysis but did not alleviate the constitutional defects of Section 58-84(b) (paras 15-17).
  The regulatory scheme, comprising Sections 58-84(b) and 26-77, was deemed facially unconstitutional for broadly prohibiting solicitation of money without a permit, which was subject to the unbridled discretion of public officials, failing to meet the intermediate scrutiny test for content-neutral ordinances that restrict speech (paras 18-21).
  The court concluded that the ordinances in question are facially invalid abridgments of First Amendment speech, rendering it unnecessary to address the Defendant’s as-applied and void-for-vagueness arguments (para 22).