AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• Attorney Sheri Raphaelson was held in direct criminal contempt by the district court for violating COVID-19 screening protocols at the courthouse. During jury selection for her client, Raphaelson disclosed to opposing counsel that she had been in contact with a confirmed-positive COVID-19 case eleven days prior. This disclosure led to a series of events, including questioning by the judge and testimony from courthouse staff, culminating in Raphaelson being sanctioned for contempt (paras 2-7).

Procedural History

• [Not applicable or not found]

Parties' Submissions

• Appellant (Sheri A. Raphaelson): Argued that the district court erred by using summary procedures for direct contempt, contending her actions constituted indirect contempt at most. She believed additional procedures would demonstrate insufficient evidence for her contempt conviction (para 1).
• Appellee (State of New Mexico): Maintained that Raphaelson's conduct amounted to direct criminal contempt by violating the Supreme Court’s orders and the local reopening plan, justifying summary punishment under Rule 5-112(C) (para 9).

Legal Issues

• Whether the district court erred in adjudicating and punishing Raphaelson for direct criminal contempt without sufficient evidence and without following due process for indirect contempt (paras 1, 9).

Disposition

• The Court of Appeals reversed and vacated Raphaelson’s conviction for direct criminal contempt, remanding for further proceedings (para 21).

Reasons

• The Court of Appeals, with Judge Henderson writing and Judges Bogardus and Medina concurring, found that Raphaelson was at most in indirect contempt of court. The court reasoned that the district court’s summary adjudication and punishment were inappropriate because Raphaelson’s conduct did not occur in the immediate view and personal knowledge of the judge, a requirement for direct contempt. The court distinguished between direct and indirect contempt, emphasizing that the judge must have personal knowledge of the alleged contemnor’s guilt for direct contempt, which was not the case here. The decision to reverse was based on procedural grounds, specifically the misuse of summary proceedings for what was deemed indirect contempt (paras 10-20).