AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• The case involves the Defendant, Ivan Mustelier-Sanchez, who was convicted for trafficking cocaine following a controlled buy arranged by the Pecos Valley Drug Task Force. The operation involved a confidential informant, Isabel Shelton, with whom the Defendant had a personal relationship, and a professional confidential source, Irigous Lindsey. Shelton, working for the Task Force, contacted the Defendant to bring a napkin containing cocaine to a prearranged location for the transaction. Despite the Defendant's reluctance and unawareness of the napkin's contents, the exchange was completed, recorded, and later led to his arrest and conviction for trafficking by distribution (paras 2-6).

Procedural History

• [Not applicable or not found]

Parties' Submissions

• Appellant (Defendant): Argued that the district court erred by not instructing the jury on subjective entrapment, claiming he was not predisposed to commit the crime and was unfairly induced by the State’s agents, specifically citing the repeated contacts and demands from Shelton, whom he loved, to bring the napkin, which he did not know contained cocaine (paras 8, 13-14).
• Appellee (State): Contended that any error in not giving a subjective entrapment instruction was harmless, suggesting that the jury's rejection of the objective entrapment defense negated the need for a subjective entrapment instruction (para 15).

Legal Issues

• Whether the district court erred in declining to instruct the jury on subjective entrapment (para 8).
• Whether the error, if any, in not instructing the jury on subjective entrapment was harmless (para 15).

Disposition

• The Court of Appeals reversed the Defendant’s conviction and remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion (para 17).

Reasons

• Per B. Zamora, J. (with Jennifer L. Attrep, J., and Megan P. Duffy, J., concurring): The Court found that the Defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on subjective entrapment, as he had presented evidence suggesting he was not predisposed to commit the crime and was unfairly induced by the State’s agents. The Court rejected the application of the inconsistent defense doctrine, noting that the Defendant’s denial of knowledge of the crime’s elements was not inconsistent with claiming entrapment. The Court determined that the Defendant had met his burden of establishing a lack of predisposition and unfair inducement, warranting the instruction on subjective entrapment. The Court disagreed with the State’s contention that the error was harmless, emphasizing that objective and subjective entrapment rest on different theories and evidentiary bases. The failure to instruct on subjective entrapment, when warranted by evidence, was deemed not harmless, leading to the reversal of the conviction (paras 7-16).