AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• On the evening of November 25, 2008, and into the early morning of November 26, 2008, Defendant and Carlos Fierro went out drinking, first at the Rio Chama Steakhouse and then at Willie’s Blues Bar, with Defendant encouraging the outing and purchasing alcohol. After leaving the bar, Fierro, driving the vehicle, struck William Tenorio, who later died from his injuries. Witnesses identified Fierro as the driver and Defendant as the passenger. Police concluded Fierro was intoxicated at the time of the accident (para 2).

Procedural History

• District Court of Santa Fe County, Michael E. Vigil, District Judge: Dismissed with prejudice one count of homicide by vehicle and one count of accident involving death or personal injuries against Defendant, concluding that the interpretation of Section 66-8-120 in State v. Marquez could not be retroactively applied to Defendant.

Parties' Submissions

• Plaintiff-Appellant (State): Argued that Section 66-8-120 provided fair notice that aiding and abetting vehicular homicide was a crime and that applying this section to Defendant’s case would not violate due process (para 1).
• Defendant-Appellee: Successfully argued in the district court that the decision in State v. Marquez, which allowed for accomplice liability under Section 66-8-120, could not be retroactively applied to Defendant’s actions prior to the decision, as it would not have provided fair notice of criminal prosecution for his conduct (para 3).

Legal Issues

• Whether the district court erred in dismissing charges against Defendant based on the conclusion that the interpretation of Section 66-8-120 in State v. Marquez could not be retroactively applied to Defendant’s conduct (para 1).
• Whether applying Section 66-8-120 to Defendant’s case violates due process by lacking fair notice of criminal prosecution for his conduct (para 1).

Disposition

• The Court of Appeals reversed the district court order dismissing the charges against Defendant and remanded for the charges to be reinstated (para 17).

Reasons

• Per LINDA M. VANZI, Judge (CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Chief Judge, JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge concurring):
  The Court of Appeals found that the State’s argument was persuasive, noting that the decision in Marquez did not overturn preexisting case law nor constitute a judicial enlargement of a criminal statute. Instead, it relied on pre-existing case law to define common terminology within the statute (paras 11-13).
  The Court concluded that the interpretation of Section 66-8-120 as set forth in Marquez was foreseeable and that Section 66-8-120 provided fair notice that the conduct Defendant engaged in could expose him to criminal prosecution. Thus, applying this interpretation to Defendant’s conduct did not violate his right to due process (paras 13-15).
  The Court also addressed the district court’s potential conclusion that Section 66-8-120 was unconstitutionally vague, finding that the statute clearly sets out that it is a crime to aid and abet in a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code, and thus provided fair notice to Defendant (paras 14-15).
  The Court emphasized that judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant continuously since the date it became law, reinforcing that Marquez’s interpretation of Section 66-8-120 was not a new or unforeseeable application of the law (para 16).