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Decision Information

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This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

  • Modesto Sanchez, who died intestate in June 2018, had given power of attorney to his daughter, Susan Whitefeather, two years prior to his death. Using this power, Whitefeather executed a special warranty deed that conveyed Sanchez's property to both of them as joint tenants. After Sanchez's death, his other daughter, Lucy Braswell, filed a lawsuit to set aside the deed, arguing that Whitefeather lacked the authority to convey the property in this manner under the New Mexico Uniform Power of Attorney Act (UPAA) (para 2).

Procedural History

  • [Not applicable or not found]

Parties' Submissions

  • Plaintiff (Lucy Braswell): Argued that the defendant lacked authority under the UPAA to convey the property as she did, asserting that an attorney-in-fact cannot make gifts on behalf of a principal unless explicitly authorized in the power of attorney. The conveyance was claimed to constitute a gift since no consideration was received by Sanchez (paras 4, 6).
  • Defendant (Susan Whitefeather): Claimed that Sanchez had intended to arrange for the distribution of his property upon his death without the need for probate by adding his daughter's name to the deed. Whitefeather argued that the deed was intended as a transfer on death deed (TODD) and requested the court to reform it accordingly. She also contended that the deed carried a presumption of consideration and that Sanchez did not have the donative intent to give a present interest, as evidenced by his continued exercise of dominion and control over the property (paras 3, 5).

Legal Issues

  • Whether the defendant was authorized under the UPAA to use her power of attorney to execute a deed conveying the property to herself and Sanchez as joint tenants.
  • Whether the conveyance constituted a gift for which no consideration was paid.
  • Whether the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment against the defendant, denying her motion to reconsider, and granting an improper remedy by quieting title to the property in favor of Sanchez’s estate (paras 1, 8, 9).

Disposition

  • The district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff was affirmed. The court also affirmed the denial of the defendant's motion to reconsider and the remedy of quieting title to the property in favor of Sanchez’s estate (paras 16, 18, 19).

Reasons

  • DUFFY, Judge (with KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge and JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge concurring):
    The court found that the plaintiff made a prima facie case that the defendant did not pay consideration for a joint tenancy interest in the property, and the defendant could not rely on the presumption of consideration due to her status as a fiduciary engaged in a self-dealing transaction (paras 12, 13).
    It was determined that even if the transfer was not a gift, the defendant did not demonstrate that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis that the power of attorney did not expressly grant authority to create a right of survivorship in the property. The court emphasized that the UPAA prohibits creating or changing a beneficiary designation or a right of survivorship unless expressly granted the authority to do so (paras 14, 15).
    The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to reconsider, as the defendant did not argue that any of the exhibits attached to the motion were unavailable before summary judgment was granted (para 17).
    Regarding the remedy, the court found no error in the district court's decision to quiet title in favor of Sanchez’s estate, noting that the current probate code requires a decedent’s real property to generally pass through probate unless subject to specific exceptions, which did not apply in this case (para 19).
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