AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

• The Defendant was charged with Criminal Sexual Penetration (CSP) in the second degree against his stepdaughter, who was sixteen or seventeen years old at the time. During jury deliberations, the jury sent two notes to the district court seeking clarification on the law related to the charges. The Defendant was not present in the courtroom when these communications occurred, and his attorney waived his presence during these exchanges (paras 2-3).

Procedural History

• [Not applicable or not found]

Parties' Submissions

• Appellant: Argued that the district court violated his constitutional and statutory right to be present at critical stages of the proceedings by reading and responding to questions from the jury in his absence. Contended that his attorney could not validly waive his presence (para 3).
• Appellee: Argued that the district court's communications with the jury fell under the exception stated in Rule 5-612(D)(3), which concerns only a conference or hearing upon a question of law. Maintained that the communications did not affect the jury’s verdict because the district court’s responses merely directed the jury to the instructions already given (paras 7-8).

Legal Issues

• Whether the district court violated the Defendant's right to be present during its communications with the jury under Rules 5-612 and 5-610 (para 5).
• Whether the State rebutted the presumption of prejudice arising from the district court's communications with the jury (para 8).

Disposition

• The Court of Appeals affirmed the Defendant’s conviction (para 11).

Reasons

• The Court of Appeals, with Chief Judge Jennifer L. Attrep writing the opinion, concurred by Judges Jacqueline R. Medina and Katherine A. Wray, found that the district court's communications with the jury concerned the subject matter of the case, thus triggering a presumption of prejudice. However, the State successfully rebutted this presumption by demonstrating that the district court's responses merely reiterated the instructions already given to the jury and did not alter them in any way. The Court also noted that the jury instructions on CSP were based on the Uniform Jury Instructions and accurately stated the law. Additionally, the Court concluded that "physical force and physical violence" have commonly understood meanings, and no additional definition was required. Therefore, the presumption of prejudice was overcome, and reversal of the conviction was not warranted (paras 5-10).