This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Defendant was convicted of two counts of criminal sexual penetration and one count of tampering with evidence. The incidents involved the Defendant and the Victim, who were former classmates. They reconnected and met in Albuquerque, where they consumed alcohol. The Defendant claimed the sexual acts were consensual, but the Victim was found unconscious with severe injuries, leading to the charges (paras 4-14).
Procedural History
- District Court: The Defendant was convicted of two counts of criminal sexual penetration and one count of tampering with evidence (para 1).
- State v. Apodaca, 2021-NMCA-001: The Court of Appeals reversed the Defendant’s convictions, finding that the district court erred by not providing a separate mistake-of-fact instruction to the jury (para 1).
Parties' Submissions
- Petitioner (State): Argued that the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the Defendant was entitled to mistake-of-fact instructions and that the jury instructions were adequate (para 19).
- Respondent (Defendant): Contended that the jury should have been instructed on his honest and reasonable belief that the Victim consented, which would negate the intent necessary for the convictions (para 20).
Legal Issues
- Was the Defendant entitled to a separate mistake-of-fact instruction regarding the Victim's capacity to consent under the Incapacity Theory and the Express Non-Consent Theory?
- Did the district court err in denying the mistake-of-fact instruction for the tampering with evidence charge?
Disposition
- The Supreme Court of New Mexico reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed all three of the Defendant’s convictions (para 49).
Reasons
Per Thomson J. (Vigil, Bacon, and Vargas JJ. concurring):
The Court clarified that a defendant prosecuted under both the Incapacity Theory and the Express Non-Consent Theory is not entitled to a separate mistake-of-fact instruction regarding the victim's capacity to consent. The jury was adequately instructed on the Incapacity Theory, which covered the Defendant's alleged mistake of fact. The Court found that the Defendant's belief about the Victim's capacity was irrelevant under the Express Non-Consent Theory, which presumes legal capacity to consent (paras 1, 26-27, 35-39).
Regarding the tampering with evidence charge, the Court held that the Defendant's belief that no crime was committed did not negate the specific intent required for tampering with evidence. The jury could infer intent to mislead law enforcement from the Defendant's actions, and thus, a mistake-of-fact instruction was unnecessary (paras 43-48).