AI Generated Opinion Summaries

This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.

Facts

The Defendant was indicted on multiple counts of first-degree criminal sexual penetration and third-degree criminal sexual contact of a minor. After being unable to post bail, the Defendant was incarcerated but later released under house arrest with strict conditions, including limited movement and supervision. The Defendant sought credit for the time spent under house arrest as presentence confinement (paras 2-3).

Procedural History

• District Court, August 5, 1992: The Defendant was released from incarceration to house arrest under strict conditions (para 2).
• District Court, June 16, 1995: The Defendant's motion to amend the judgment to include house arrest time as presentence confinement credit was denied (para 3).

Parties' Submissions

• Defendant-Appellant: Argued that the time spent under house arrest should qualify as "official confinement" under NMSA 1978, Section 31-20-12, as the restrictions on his freedom were sufficiently onerous to warrant credit (paras 3, 5).
• Plaintiff-Appellee: Contended that house arrest does not meet the statutory definition of "official confinement" because it lacks the custodial control and punitive conditions of incarceration in a state-controlled facility (paras 3, 9-11).

Legal Issues

• Whether time spent under house arrest qualifies as "official confinement" for the purpose of presentence confinement credit under NMSA 1978, Section 31-20-12.

Disposition

• The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that house arrest does not constitute "official confinement" under the statute (para 21).

Reasons

Per Bustamante J. (Bosson and Armijo JJ. concurring):

The Court analyzed the statutory language of NMSA 1978, Section 31-20-12, and found no clear legislative intent to include house arrest as "official confinement." The Court emphasized that "official confinement" requires either actual or constructive custody by law enforcement or correctional officers and the possibility of an escape charge for unauthorized departure. The Defendant's house arrest did not meet these criteria, as he was released to a relative's custody and was not subject to an escape charge for non-compliance (paras 4-19).

The Court also reviewed case law from other jurisdictions, noting that the majority of courts have held that house arrest lacks the restrictive and custodial elements necessary to qualify as confinement. The Court found these precedents persuasive and consistent with New Mexico's statutory framework (paras 9-13).

The Court concluded that while house arrest imposes restrictions, it does not equate to the punitive and custodial nature of incarceration in a state-controlled facility. Therefore, the Defendant was not entitled to presentence confinement credit for the time spent under house arrest (paras 17-21).