This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The case concerns a dispute over a special-use permit granted to a partner in a dairy business to operate a dairy on his property in Dona Ana County. Local landowners and residents objected to the permit, citing concerns about its impact. A county commissioner who opposed the permit participated in the appeal process, raising questions about bias and procedural fairness (paras 3-5).
Procedural History
- Dona Ana County Planning and Zoning Commission (PZC): Granted the special-use permit to operate the dairy, contingent on state approval of the wastewater discharge plan (para 3).
- Board of County Commissioners (Appeals Board): Overturned the PZC's decision, with a contested vote involving a commissioner alleged to be biased (para 4).
- District Court, September 4, 1990: Reversed the Appeals Board's decision, disqualifying the biased commissioner's vote and reinstating the PZC's grant of the permit (para 6).
- District Court, May 28, 1991: After intervention by local landowners, the court set aside its prior judgment, ruling that the county ordinance requiring a two-thirds majority vote was invalid under state law and affirming the Appeals Board's denial of the permit (paras 9-10).
Parties' Submissions
- Appellant (Dairy Partner): Argued that the district court erred in setting aside its September 4, 1990, judgment and that the motion to vacate was untimely under Rule 1-060(B) (paras 1, 10).
- Respondent (Intervenors): Claimed that the original judgment was void due to lack of jurisdiction, deprivation of due process, and the absence of indispensable parties. They also argued that extraordinary circumstances justified relief under Rule 1-060(B)(6) (paras 8, 12, 18).
Legal Issues
- Whether the district court had authority to vacate its September 4, 1990, judgment under Rule 1-060(B) after the time for appeal had expired.
- Whether extraordinary circumstances justified relief under Rule 1-060(B)(6).
- Whether the original judgment was void due to jurisdictional or procedural deficiencies.
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's May 28, 1991, order setting aside the September 4, 1990, judgment (para 25).
Reasons
Per Hartz J. (Bivins and Chavez JJ. concurring):
Timeliness under Rule 1-060(B)(1): The court held that motions to correct judicial errors of law under Rule 1-060(B)(1) must be filed within the time allowed for an appeal. Allowing such motions after the appeal period would undermine the principle of finality and the efficiency of judicial resources (paras 15-16).
Extraordinary Circumstances under Rule 1-060(B)(6): The court found no extraordinary circumstances justifying relief. The intervenors' reliance on the county to protect their interests and their delay in seeking intervention did not meet the threshold for extraordinary circumstances. The Supreme Court's writ of superintending control merely allowed intervention but did not establish grounds for setting aside the judgment (paras 18-22).
Void Judgment Argument: The court rejected the claim that the original judgment was void, as the district court had jurisdiction to hear the case and issue its September 4, 1990, judgment (para 24).
Finality of Litigation: The court emphasized the importance of finality in litigation and held that the intervenors' decision to rely on the county's representation and not appeal the original judgment was a calculated choice that did not warrant relief under Rule 1-060(B) (paras 23-24).