This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Defendant was convicted in 1982 of two counts of larceny over $100 and two counts of commercial burglary, all fourth-degree felonies. The sentencing court found aggravating circumstances and increased each sentence by one-third above the basic sentence of 18 months. Additionally, the Defendant was found to be a habitual offender with three prior felony convictions, resulting in an eight-year enhancement for each count. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively, totaling 40 years (para 2).
Procedural History
- First Judicial District Court, May 5, 1994: The court granted the Defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, finding that the Defendant had not been given prior notice of the intent to aggravate his sentence or the specific aggravating factors relied upon. The sentence was vacated, and the case was remanded for a new sentencing hearing (para 3).
- Third Judicial District Court, January 10, 1995: Judge Cornish denied the Defendant's motion for resentencing, asserting that the prior order for remand had no legal force (para 4).
- First Judicial District Court, September 6, 1995: A second order for remand for a new sentencing hearing was issued (para 5).
Parties' Submissions
- Defendant-Appellant: Argued that he was entitled to a de novo resentencing hearing because the original sentence was vacated. He also contended that Judge Cornish erred in refusing to honor his peremptory excusal and should have recused himself due to potential bias from a prejudicial letter in the court file (paras 8-9, 12, 14).
- Plaintiff-Appellee: Asserted that the remand was limited to addressing the aggravated portion of the sentence and that the Defendant had already received the maximum relief possible. The State also declined to seek enhancement for aggravating circumstances during the resentencing (paras 10-11).
Legal Issues
- Was the Defendant entitled to a de novo resentencing hearing upon remand?
- Did the trial court err in refusing to honor the Defendant's peremptory excusal of the judge?
- Should the trial judge have recused himself due to potential bias?
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the amended judgment and sentence (para 17).
Reasons
Per Benny E. Flores J. (Harris L. Hartz CJ and Richard C. Bosson J. concurring):
De Novo Resentencing: The court held that the remand was limited to addressing the aggravated portion of the sentence, as the Defendant had not received adequate notice of the State's intent to seek enhancement. Since the State chose not to pursue enhancement, the trial court's role became "almost ministerial," and the Defendant received the maximum relief possible. Thus, there was no denial of due process (paras 9-11).
Peremptory Excusal: The court found that the Defendant's notice of peremptory excusal was untimely, as it was filed ten months after the notice of assignment of Judge Cornish. Additionally, the Defendant had already exercised his right to excuse one judge, which barred further peremptory excusals under the applicable rules (paras 12-13).
Recusal: The court determined that Judge Cornish did not abuse his discretion in refusing to recuse himself. The judge had no prior familiarity with the case or the prejudicial letter in the court file, and there was no evidence that the letter influenced his decision. The judge's role was limited to correcting the illegal sentence, further reducing the likelihood of bias (paras 14-15).