This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The case arose when the Attorney General initiated an action against the Petitioner. Following the reassignment of the case to a new judge, the Petitioner filed a peremptory notice of excusal within the prescribed ten-day period. However, the judge refused to honor the notice, asserting that his prior discretionary act of granting an unopposed motion for an extension of time nullified the Petitioner's right to excuse him (paras 1-2).
Procedural History
- [Not applicable or not found]
Parties' Submissions
- Petitioner: Argued that the failure to oppose another party's motion seeking a discretionary act should not be construed as an act invoking the discretion of the court, and thus should not nullify the right to file a peremptory notice of excusal (para 2).
- Respondent: Asserted that the judge's signing of the order granting an extension of time constituted a discretionary act, which nullified the Petitioner's right to exercise a peremptory excusal (para 1).
Legal Issues
- Whether the judge's discretionary act of granting an unopposed motion for an extension of time nullified the Petitioner's right to file a peremptory notice of excusal.
Disposition
- The Supreme Court of New Mexico granted the writ of mandamus, instructing the district court to honor the Petitioner's notice of excusal (para 7).
Reasons
Per Ransom CJ (Baca, Montgomery, Franchini, and Frost JJ. concurring):
The Court held that the right to file a peremptory notice of excusal is judge-specific and is not nullified unless a party affirmatively requests the successor judge to perform a discretionary act. The Court clarified that merely agreeing not to oppose a motion does not constitute an affirmative request for discretionary action. Requiring opposition solely to preserve the right to excusal would undermine judicial economy and increase costs and delays. The Court emphasized that only the party requesting the discretionary act is precluded from later exercising a peremptory challenge (paras 3-6).