This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The taxpayer, Unisys Corporation, filed a claim for a refund of gross receipts taxes paid between January 1988 and June 1991. The Secretary of the New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department did not act on the claim within the statutory 120-day period. The taxpayer failed to file a written protest or civil action within the required 30 days after the 120-day period elapsed. Subsequently, the taxpayer refiled the claim, but the portion of the claim related to taxes paid in 1988 was barred due to statutory time limitations (paras 2-3).
Procedural History
- Administrative Hearing, New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department: The hearing officer denied the taxpayer's protest, holding that the Secretary had discretion to refuse to act on the refund claim (para 3).
Parties' Submissions
- Appellant (Unisys Corporation): Argued that under Section 7-1-26(A) of the New Mexico Statutes, the Secretary was required to act on its refund claim and that the hearing officer's interpretation of the statute was erroneous (para 3).
- Respondent (New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department): Contended that the statute granted the Secretary discretion to act or not act on refund claims and that the taxpayer had remedies available, which it failed to pursue (paras 11-12).
Legal Issues
- Whether the Secretary of the New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department is required to act on a taxpayer's claim for a refund under Section 7-1-26(A) of the New Mexico Statutes.
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the hearing officer, holding that the Secretary is not required to act on a refund claim and that the taxpayer failed to utilize the remedies provided by the statute (paras 16-17).
Reasons
Per Pickard J. (Alarid and Flores JJ. concurring):
The Court held that Section 7-1-26(A) of the New Mexico Statutes grants the Secretary discretion to act or not act on refund claims. The statute uses the permissive term "may" rather than the mandatory "shall," and the legislature juxtaposed these terms within the statute, indicating an intentional distinction (paras 5-8). The Court rejected the taxpayer's reliance on precedent where permissive language was interpreted as mandatory, finding that the public interest in this case did not rise to the level of those precedents (paras 9-11).
The Court emphasized that the statute provides taxpayers with remedies in cases of inaction by the Secretary, including filing a written protest or commencing a civil action within 30 days after the 120-day period. The taxpayer failed to pursue these remedies despite being advised to do so (paras 11-12). The Court also noted that the statutory scheme balances the interests of both taxpayers and the Secretary by allowing either party to prompt action or delay resolution, depending on their circumstances (paras 13-15).
The Court concluded that the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and the taxpayer cannot compel the Secretary to act without utilizing the remedies provided by the statute. Therefore, the hearing officer's decision was affirmed (paras 16-17).