This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Defendant was accused of criminal sexual contact of a minor (CSCM) and false imprisonment. The allegations stemmed from an incident where an eleven-year-old girl entered the Defendant's home to borrow scissors. The Defendant allegedly restrained the child on his lap, touched her vagina through her clothes, and kissed her with his tongue. The child struggled to escape but was restrained twice during the incident (paras 2-3).
Procedural History
- District Court, May 13, 1996: The Defendant's first trial ended in a mistrial due to a hung jury (para 4).
- District Court, November 12, 1996: The Defendant's second trial also ended in a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury (para 7).
- District Court, August 7, 1997: The Defendant was convicted of CSCM and false imprisonment in a third trial (para 10).
Parties' Submissions
- Defendant: Argued that the third trial violated his rights to due process and fundamental fairness, and that sentencing on both charges violated double jeopardy protections. He also challenged the admission of polygraph evidence and the trial judge's refusal to recuse himself (para 11).
- State: Asserted that the third trial was valid, the charges were distinct and did not violate double jeopardy, the polygraph evidence was admissible under Rule 11-707, and there was no basis for the trial judge to recuse himself (paras 11, 13, 20, 24, 32).
Legal Issues
- Did the third trial violate the Defendant's rights to due process and fundamental fairness?
- Did sentencing on both charges violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy?
- Was the admission of polygraph evidence erroneous?
- Should the trial judge have recused himself from the third trial?
Disposition
- The Defendant's convictions and sentences were affirmed (para 34).
Reasons
Per M. Christina Armijo J. (Bosson and Wechsler JJ. concurring):
Due Process and Fundamental Fairness: The court found no violation of due process in allowing a third trial. The mistrials were validly entered, and there was no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct or abuse of power. The Defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice resulting from the third trial, and his financial and logistical challenges were attributed to his own delays in seeking remedies (paras 13-19).
Double Jeopardy: The court held that the Defendant's conduct was not unitary. The acts of CSCM and false imprisonment were distinct, separated by intent and action. The Defendant restrained the child twice, with separate objectives for each act, justifying separate charges and sentences (paras 20-23).
Polygraph Evidence: The Defendant's objection to the polygraph evidence under Rule 11-702 was not preserved for appeal. The court noted that the Defendant failed to raise a specific objection during the third trial and did not provide evidence challenging the reliability of the polygraph. The court also emphasized that it lacked authority to revise the Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 11-707 (paras 24-31).
Recusal of Judge: The court found no evidence of bias or impropriety by the trial judge. The judge's recusal from the second trial was due to a scheduling conflict, not bias, and there was no basis for recusal in the third trial (paras 32-33).