This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Defendant was charged with seven misdemeanor and three felony counts of voyeurism. A competency evaluation was requested, and the Defendant was found incompetent to stand trial but not dangerous. The Defendant was hospitalized and later taken into federal custody, missing a rescheduled dangerousness hearing. The district court dismissed the charges with prejudice, leading to the State's appeal (paras 2-3).
Procedural History
- District Court, Doña Ana County: The district court found the Defendant incompetent but not dangerous and dismissed the charges with prejudice (para 1).
Parties' Submissions
- Appellant (State): Argued that the district court erred in dismissing the charges with prejudice, as the statute only allows for dismissal without prejudice when a defendant is found incompetent but not dangerous (para 3).
- Appellee (Defendant): Contended that the statute's language permits dismissal with prejudice and alternatively argued for the application of the right for any reason doctrine (para 5).
Legal Issues
- Whether the district court erred in dismissing the charges against the Defendant with prejudice when the statute allows for dismissal only without prejudice (para 3).
Disposition
- The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision and remanded for entry of judgment dismissing the case without prejudice (para 6).
Reasons
Per Henderson J. (Hanisee and Yohalem JJ. concurring): The Court of Appeals conducted a de novo review of the statutory interpretation and procedural rules. It concluded that the language of Section 31-9-1.2(A) and Rule 5-602.2(E) only permits dismissal without prejudice when a defendant is found incompetent but not dangerous. The Court relied on precedent from State v. Holbert, which interpreted the same statutory language, and declined to reinterpret the statute differently. The Court also rejected the Defendant's alternative argument regarding the right for any reason doctrine, as the district court's order was explicitly based on Section 31-9-1.2(A) (paras 3-5).