This summary was computer-generated without any editorial revision. It is not official, has not been checked for accuracy, and is NOT citable.
Facts
The Defendant was convicted of two counts of criminal sexual penetration and one count of tampering with evidence. The incidents involved the Defendant and the Victim, who were former classmates. They reconnected and met in Albuquerque, where they consumed alcohol. The Defendant claimed the sexual acts were consensual, but the Victim was found unconscious with severe injuries, leading to the charges (paras 1, 4-14).
Procedural History
- State v. Apodaca, 2021-NMCA-001: The Court of Appeals reversed the Defendant's convictions, finding that the district court erred by not providing a separate mistake-of-fact instruction to the jury (para 1).
Parties' Submissions
- Plaintiff-Petitioner (State of New Mexico): Argued that the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the Defendant was entitled to mistake-of-fact instructions and that the jury instructions were adequate (para 19).
- Defendant-Respondent (Joseph R. Apodaca): Contended that the jury should have been instructed on his belief that the Victim consented and that the Court of Appeals correctly reversed his convictions due to the lack of a mistake-of-fact instruction (para 20).
Legal Issues
- Was the Defendant entitled to a separate mistake-of-fact instruction regarding the Victim's capacity to consent under the State’s Incapacity Theory?
- Was the Defendant entitled to a mistake-of-fact instruction under the State’s Express Non-Consent Theory?
- Was the Defendant entitled to a mistake-of-fact instruction concerning his tampering with evidence conviction?
Disposition
- The Supreme Court of New Mexico reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed all of the Defendant’s convictions (para 49).
Reasons
Per Thomson, Chief Justice (Vigil, Bacon, and Vargas JJ. concurring):
The Court found that the Defendant was not entitled to a separate mistake-of-fact instruction under the State’s Incapacity Theory because the jury was adequately instructed on the issue of the Victim's incapacity to consent (paras 35-36). The Court also determined that under the State’s Express Non-Consent Theory, the issue was whether the Victim actually consented, not the Defendant's belief about her capacity, thus negating the need for a mistake-of-fact instruction (paras 37-42). Regarding the tampering with evidence charge, the Court concluded that the Defendant's belief about the legality of his actions did not negate the specific intent required for tampering, as the intent to mislead law enforcement was sufficient for conviction (paras 43-48).